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Abstract
We study social networks and focus on covert (also known as hidden) networks,
such as terrorist or criminal networks. Their structures, memberships and ac-
tivities are illegal. Thus, data about covert networks is often incomplete and
partially incorrect, making interpreting structures and activities of such net-
works challenging. For legal reasons, real data about active covert networks is
inaccessible to researchers. To address these challenges, we introduce here a
network generator for synthetic networks that are statistically similar to a real
network but void of personal information about its members. The generator
uses statistical data about a real or imagined covert organization network. It
generates randomized instances of the Stochastic Block model of the network
groups but preserves this network organizational structure. The direct use of
such anonymized networks is for training on them the research and analytical
tools for finding structure and dynamics of covert networks. Since these syn-
thetic networks differ in their sets of edges and communities, they can be used
as a new source for network analytics. First, they provide alternative interpreta-
tions of the data about the original network. The distribution of probabilities for
these alternative interpretations enables new network analytics. The analysts
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can find community structures which are frequent, therefore stable under per-
turbations. They may also analyze how the stability changes with the strength
of perturbation. For covert networks, the analysts can quantify statistically ex-
pected outcomes of interdiction. This kind of analytics applies to all complex
network in which the data are incomplete or partially incorrect.
Keywords: Social networks, Random weighted network generator, Network
structure stability, Covert networks, Hierarchical networks
1. Introduction
The randomized generation of synthetic networks is often used for test-
ing which properties of a given network depend on its structure and features
(Barabási et al., 2000; Elsisy et al., 2019). Such a use has become popular
since Erdós and Rényi introduced the random network model (Erdös and Rényi,
1959). It generates an edge between each pair of nodes with a fixed probability p.
The resulting networks are highly random as expected. Yet, despite interesting
mathematical properties of this model, later research discovered that random
networks rarely arise in nature or engineering practice. The more advanced mod-
els proposed later include the scale-free network model (Barabási and Albert,
1999) and its variants that represent the structures of many social and naturally
arising networks. Another one is the Stochastic Block Model (SBM) (Holland
et al., 1983) which extends the random network model by grouping nodes into
blocks. The probability of an edge between a pair of nodes is now determined
by the probability of connection between the blocks to which the nodes belong.
This model produces community structure resembling those arising in real net-
works but limits the differences between degrees of individual nodes located in
the same block. This weakness is addressed by SBM variants, such as the de-
gree planted SBM (Karrer and Newman, 2011) or the degree-corrected planted
partition model (Newman, 2016). The Lancichinetti-Fortunato-Radicchi (LFR)
benchmark (Lancichinetti et al., 2008) generates synthetic networks with the
desired heterogeneity of the node degrees and community size distribution. The
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generated networks are customized using such parameters as power law ex-
ponents for the node degrees, the community size, and the density of edges
within the same community to mimic real networks. These networks are often
used to test community detection methods. A model presented in (Xiao et al.,
2020) generates synthetic networks by rewiring edges in real-life networks. The
more edges are rewired, the blurrier the communities become, allowing only
the increasingly more stable communities to prevail. Another generative model
creates a hierarchical multi-layer networks that are often used to represent the
hierarchical management structures (Ravasz and Barabási, 2003).
In general, we are interested in computer based social networks that have
been supported by the growing number of computer platforms and companies.
The activities in such networks generate massive amounts of data, to which,
however, access is increasingly limited due to privacy concerns. We are par-
ticularly interested in covert (a.k.a. hidden) networks, such as terrorist and
criminal networks. The common trait of such networks is that they try to
hide their membership, structure, and illegal activities. The membership in
such networks is often secretive. Their essential interactions are covert, so their
non-essential interactions seem overly visible, making essential ones difficult to
observe. Law enforcement in most of the countries is limited in the means of
collected data by privacy laws protecting citizens from unjustified surveillance.
As a result, the data about covert networks is often incomplete and partially
incorrect. This creates a challenge in interpreting or discerning the structure
and activities of such networks. An additional challenge arises from the inac-
cessibility to researchers of data about networks under investigations. Only for
a fraction of networks whose members were prosecuted in the court, such data
becomes publicly available.
A network generator introduced here addresses these challenges. It is de-
signed to create a set of synthetic networks, each structurally similar to a
real network, but with anonymous nodes that are interconnected or clustered
slightly differently than nodes in the original network. The direct use of such
anonymized networks is to train research and analytical tools for finding struc-
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ture and dynamics of covert networks. However, the synthetic networks provide
alternative interpretations of the data about the original network. The dis-
tribution of probabilities for these alternative interpretations enables users to
quantify statistically expected outcomes of operations on the covert networks.
Another use of the alternative interpretations is to decide if the data collected
for the given covert network is sufficient for getting a reliable interpretation
of this network’s structure and dynamics. A high frequency of alternative in-
terpretations of the original network structure make them likely candidates for
ground truth structure. To decide which interpretation is most likely the true
structure of the original network may require collecting additional data.
The synthetic networks created by our generator can also be useful for an-
alyzing the social networks with partial information about their structures and
bio-medical networks in which massive collection of experimental data about
network dynamics makes the data partially incomplete and incorrect.
2. A model of organizations represented by covert networks
Discovery and monitoring of covert networks often rely on getting access to
information flows among nodes suspected to be involved in network activities.
This flow may involve wiretapped telephone interactions, message exchanges,
recorded conversations, or copies of written documents. We refer to an organi-
zation represented by such a network as covert and to the nodes as members.
Using community detection, we discover what we call groups of members who
interact among themselves more often than with other members. We prefer
this term over communities, which usually denotes the nodes having casual re-
lationships, or clusters, which refer to subsets of nodes with similar values for
selected attributes. In small organizations, groups could be independent of the
organizational structure of the network, but more often they have a hierarchical
structure for management nodes. The number of hierarchy levels depends on
the organization size. Our model represents each group by parameters such as
the average density of edges inside the group, from this group to other groups,
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and the placements of group members in the organization hierarchy. The model
uses parameters to individualize group leader connections to members of its
group and, separately, to other nodes. Given an original network, the generator
individualizes it by randomly rewiring edges of its groups and its management
hierarchy (Ravasz and Barabási, 2003). As a result, our model combines two
network models: SBM for groups and hierarchical network for management
structure.
Most of the previously proposed synthetic network generators rely only on
one network generative model. For example, in (Shang et al., 2020) the authors
propose a network generator that creates synthetic multi-layered networks. A
network generator presented in (Guo and Kraines, 2009) implements small-world
social networks with the desired high clustering coefficient. Another network
generator described in (Benyahia et al., 2016) creates dynamic networks with
the prescribed community structure.
3. Data
To present our generator in action, we use the Caviar and Ciel datasets
(Morselli, 2009). The former defines a drug smuggling network, using data col-
lected from 1994 to 1996 by an investigation of the West End Gang in Montreal,
Canada. This gang was active in trafficking hashish and cocaine. During the
investigation, police repeatedly confiscated shipments of drugs, but made no
arrests until the investigation ended. The collected data mainly consists of the
lists of phone calls made among gang members. Every two months, investiga-
tors were creating a snapshot of the network, in which each edge represents the
calls made between two nodes during the corresponding two months and the
edge weight is equal to the number of these calls. In total 11 snapshots were
collected. The snapshots allow us to observe the network reactions to the ship-
ment confiscations, and to the changes in positions of members in the network
occurring between snapshots.
In the case of the Caviar network, we know which nodes had some man-
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agement roles from the publicly released court proceedings. For example, these
proceedings identified node N1 (see Fig. 2) as the leader of the hashish group,
and node N12 as the leader of the cocaine group. Fig. 1 shows more nodes in
management roles in the Caviar groups. Still, the community detection algo-
rithm alone did not assign many low degree nodes to any group (Bahulkar et al.,
2018). We also present the results obtained with the Ciel dataset (Morselli,
Figure 1: Illustration of our model integration of the stochastic block model (SBM) with the
hierarchical multi-layer network model in the Caviar network. Nodes marked with the same
color belong to the same group. Nodes placed at the same hierarchy levels play the same roles
in the management of this network.
2009), which defines an illicit drug transportation network that was engaged in
trafficking in hashish from Jamaica in Montreal. The collection of data lasted
from May 1996 to June 1997. The data defines a network with weighted edges
representing the volumes of nodes’ interactions obtained from the records of
telephone calls and conversation surveillance. Only key managers of the net-
work groups are identified. Nodes N1, N2, and N10 all took part in leading the
network. There was no listing of the ground truth groups. For both networks,
we use the Louvain community detection algorithm (Blondel et al., 2008) to find
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groups and the relative betweenness centrality to find nodes involved in man-
agerial roles. Since criminal networks often have sparse connectivity because of
attempts to hide network activities, we execute a version of Louvain algorithm
for graphs with undirected edges. For this execution, we temporally transform
directed edges of the generated networks into undirected ones, summing their
weights for pairs of nodes which have two opposing edges connecting them.
Covert networks may prioritize either efficiency or security, but not both. The
Network Caviar Ciel
Node identifier N1 N3 N12 N76 N1 N2 N10
RBC score 0.430 0.180 0.303 0.078 0.591 0.641 0.015
Rank of the score 1 3 2 4 2 1 7
Table 1: The relative betweenness centrality of the management nodes of the Caviar and
Ciel networks reveals their different priorities in managing criminal organization. In the
Caviar network managers are strongly connected to the nodes in their groups, which improves
efficiency of management. In contrast, In Ciel network management nodes connect direct only
to subordinates. This may benefit security of node N10.
betweenness centrality of a node measures a fraction of the shortest paths of
information flow between all pairs of nodes passing through this node (Unnithan
et al., 2014). A normalized version of this metric, called relative betweenness
centrality, limits its range to [0,1]. We use it for ease of comparison of the
results. We conclude that the structures of the Caviar and Ciel networks are
fundamentally different. The Caviar network prioritized efficiency. This is indi-
cated by the highest relative betweenness centrality scores of the management
nodes, which are N1, boss, and N3, N12, N76, managers, among all nodes in
the Caviar network (cf. Table 1). The implied easy access to these nodes from
others supports high efficiency of information flow in the network, but low se-
curity for the leader nodes. In contrast, in the Ciel network, the boss limits
the connections to direct subordinates. Consequently, node N10 has a very low
relative betweenness centrality (RBC) when compared to the manager nodes,
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N1 and N2, (see Table 1) even though some management role was plausible for
him (Morselli, 2009).
We chose the Caviar and Ciel datasets for our study because they are
well studied and analyzed using public data released during court proceedings
(Bahulkar et al., 2018; Berlusconi, 2013; Skillicorn et al., 2013). We show that
synthetic networks generated by our generator for both networks are similar to
the original ones. This is important because only pieces of the ground truth are
available for covert networks under investigation.
4. Implementation of the Random Anonymized Network Generator
4.1. Overview
The Random Anonymized Network Generator (RANG) organizes its network
generation process into the following three steps. The owners of the original
network data execute the first step. They need to replace node identity and
its personal data by a single unique numerical ID of this node. They also
need to assign to each node its place in the management hierarchy, a group to
which this node belongs and two lists, one of the subordinates and the other of
superiors. The second step is executed by RANG software. It summarizes the
group structure of the network as the list of probabilities of an edge between any
pair of nodes. These probabilities depend on groups to which the nodes belong
and the roles these nodes play in the network. The obtained data are shared
with the outside users or used internally by the owners. The third step generates
a set of synthetic random networks using the edge probabilities defined in the
second step and analyzes this set for a group structure stability and nodes’
management roles consistency.
4.2. Generating groups in covert networks
Social networks often have directed weighted edges to represent intensity
of interactions measured in frequency of calls, messages, or meetings. Within
SBM, we use one of the two models to assign weights to edges.
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The first process for assigning edges is called the Weighted Random Graph
(WRG) generator (Garlaschelli, 2009). Let W denote the sum of weight of all
edges and E the maximum number of edges we can generate between subsets
of nodes. In WRG, the edges’ weights are generated by running Bernoulli trials
with probability p = WW+E . This run stops at the first failed trial. The number
of successful trials before this failure defines the weight of the generated edge.
This process gives rise to the geometric distribution of edge weights.
We introduce here an alternative approach, named Bernoulli Weighted Ran-
dom Network (BWRN) model. It has two parameters. One is a vector of the
weights w’s for edges in the original graph, and the other is the probability pB
that controls the variance of the generated weight distribution. The process of
generating edges starts with the heaviest edges and progresses down to edges
with the smallest weight. Given the currently processed weight w, an associated
weight is computed as wB = bw/pBc. For each edge with w weight in the origi-
nal graph, we select a weight in the range [0, dw/pBe] as follows. First, we select
randomly a pair of not yet connected nodes and run wB Bernoulli trials with
probability pB . If pBwB < w, we do one more Bernoulli trial with probability
pa = w−pBwB . The weight from such a run is equal to the number of successes
in those trials. The edge is not created when this run returns weight 0.
This design yields a distribution of weights with probability of choosing
weight k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ dw/pBe is defined as:
pw(k, pB) =

(wB)!
(wB−k)!k!p
k
B(1− pB)wB−k if k ≤ wB
w − pBwB for k = wB + 1 if pBwB < w
(1)
As a result, the average sum of weights of all edges created by this process is
the same as in the original network. Indeed, the expected weight from Equation
1 is pBwB + w − pBwB = w.
The parameter pB defines probability that the edge of weight w will not be
generated, which is (1 − pB)wB if w = pBwB and (1 − pB)wB (1 − w + pBw)
otherwise, so it quickly decreases with increase of w and pB . With pB > 0.9
even edges with weight 1 have low chance of below 1% to be lost. An interesting
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trade-off arises for slightly lower values of pB . For example with pB = 0.875,
which we used for computational experiments here, about 10% of such edges
will not appear in the generated network but a similar fraction of edges will
increase their weight to 2, strengthening cohesiveness of some communities.
The variance of the distribution of the weights generated for an edge with
weight w in the original data is w(1 − pB) + pa(pB − pa) ≈ w(1 − pB) (Feller,
1968), so it grows with increase in w but decays with increase of pB1. Thus,
selecting large pB will make generated synthetic networks more similar to the
original one, while decreasing it would have opposite effects. Hence, different
kinds of analyses could be conducted with different choices of pB .
By taking into account weights of edges, our model allows users to define
different edge densities in the group for edges at the same level of hierarchy
(e.g., among peers) than for edges across the hierarchy (e.g., between the group
leader and a subordinate). This enables users to account for typically higher
information flow intensities between managers and subordinates than among
peers.
4.3. Detecting groups in the generated networks
To test the accuracy of our synthetic network generator, we ran the Lou-
vain community detection algorithm Blondel et al. (2008) on all the generated
networks and compared the generated groups to the groups in the original net-
work. Yet, there are many high quality community detection algorithms, such
as SpeakEasy Gaiteri et al. (2015), which we triesd and it yielded similar re-
sults, CPM Traag et al. (2011), modularity maximization Chen et al. (2014),
fast Clauset et al. (2004), or adaptive modularity Lu et al. (2018) that can be
used for this purpose on social and covert networks, so users of RANG can use
any of them for this purpose.
We observe that in the Caviar and Ciel networks, these two groups often
1Indeed
∑wB
k=0 k
2pk(1− pa) + k2 ∗ pkpa + (2k + 1)pkpa = w(1− pB) +w2 + pa(pB − pa).
Hence V ar(pB , w) = w(1− pB) + pa(pB − pa)
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do not match perfectly. There are several reasons for such differences. First,
datasets for covert networks are incomplete and may have many undetected
edges. Second, important nodes are often so highly interconnected, that they
may belong to several different groups. For example, in Caviar, nodes N1 and N3
belong to the same group in the originla graph, but N3 has so many connections
to other groups that the generator occasionally assigns it to them. For similar
reasons such miss-assignments may happen to the managers. At the same time,
such a miss-assignment may signal diverse roles that such a node plays in the
network. Hence, comparative analysis of groups discovered in the synthetically
generated networks may shed a new light on the operations of the original covert
network.
We also detect the network hierarchy levels to reveal the structural prop-
erties of the generated networks. We use the relative betweenness centrality,
which is easy to compute, as a hierarchy level measure because in networks
there is a strong correlation between the hierarchy measures and betweenness
centrality scores (Rajeh et al., 2020). Comparing the nodes with high relative
betweenness centrality in the generated network and such nodes in the orig-
inal network enables us to measure how well the generated networks preserve
leadership hierarchy. A Combined Score (CS) measures overall similarity of gen-
erated networks to the original one. CS is a product of the group and hierarchy
similarities.
4.4. Steps for generating synthetic networks
The owners of the data about the original (real or synthetic) network need
to provide as input three lists about this network. They need first to anonymize
input data by removing any personal information about the nodes and instead
provide just lists of nodes, each represented by a pair with an abstract node
identifier and the level of management hierarchy to which this node belongs. The
second is the list of all edges, each providing identifiers of its starting and ending
nodes and its weight. The third is the list of groups, each group represented by
the list of identifiers of its members based on the original network and, unless a
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group is independent, the identifier of a group leader. Alternatively, the owners
may prefer to generate a synthetic network from this input since the output of
the generator is in the required format and the generated network is different
from the original.
The processing of the input data starts with computation of probabilities of
existence and weights of edges for the generated network. We use two models
to assign randomized weights to the weighted edges. Both methods classify
the edges into several classes and generate edges and weights for each class
separately. The first class includes internal edges of a group gi of size |gi| at the
same level of management hierarchy, so including members but not superiors
of the neighbors. In such a case, there are Ei = |gi|(|gi| − 1) directed edges.
Let W i denote the sum of their weights. The second class includes edges across
the members of two different groups gi, gj . There are Ei,j = |gi||gj | such edges
from gi to gj and Ej,i in the opposite direction. Let sums of their weights be
denoted asW i,j ,W j,i. The next class includes edges from a superior, s(i) to the
members of its group gi and from the group members to this superior. There
are Es(i),i = Ei,s(i) = |gi| of such edges in each direction. Their sums of weights
are denoted as W s(i),i,W i,s(i). Let |¬i| denote the number of all nodes not in
a group gi at the level of management of members of this group. We define the
class of edges from the superior of group i to ¬i nodes as Es(i),¬i = |¬i| in each
direction, with the sum of weights denoted W s(i),¬i.
One solution uses the Weighted Random Graph (WRG) approach (Gar-
laschelli, 2009). The second solution uses the Bernoulli Weighted Random Net-
work (BWRN). Section Generative models networks discusses both solutions.
Next, the management roles are assigned to the nodes. Our model allows
for an arbitrary number of management hierarchy levels. Yet, given that both
Caviar and Ciel networks are composed of small groups, we set here the limit for
their hierarchy levels at three. The number of nodes assigned to each hierarchy
level higher than one depends on the total number of groups at the immediately
lower level. The third level of management consists of the highest authority
node in the local network. We refer to such a node as a boss. We refer to the
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nodes at the second level as managers. The first level of hierarchy is composed
of the remaining nodes organized into groups. We call such nodes members.
As explained in the next section, our network generator attempts to find the
group managers even without any information from the network investigators.
Managers serve as intermediaries between the boss and the members. The
review of the literature reveals that the majority of small companies have a
ratio of four employees per manager (Davison, 2003). This is a bit smaller than
in case of covert networks, such as Caviar, where this ratio is close to six. The
plausible reasons for this difference include self-motivation of the members for
doing their tasks, as well as keeping a fraction of the organization members
interacting with the boss small for safety reasons.
Not all groups are supervised through hierarchical management. We refer to
such a group as independent. A group of small size and a low fraction of recipro-
cal connections is likely to be independent. An example is the money-laundering
group in the Caviar network that might be regarded as independent. Its mem-
bers have only outgoing edges targeting the outside nodes. Thus, members do
not have incoming edges from any other node in the network.
4.5. Baseline network generator
To get a better baseline for network accuracy than the Erdös-Rényi random
network, we built a straightforward extension of SBM by supporting weighted
directed edges with integer weight. It takes as input lists of network nodes,
edges with integer weights, and groups in the original network. The first step
is to count, for each group, the sum of weights of all edges inside this group,
and then edges of this group leading to and from each other group. These sums
become probabilities by dividing them by the sum of weights of all the network
edges. Using the built-in numpy (Oliphant, 2006) random choice method, the
baseline generator picks a pair of groups, including those in which the source
and target groups are the same. Then, a node from the source group and a
node from the target group are selected repeatedly until the selected nodes are
different, thus avoiding self-loops. Using the created set of probabilities, we
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select the probability for the selected group and execute a Bernoulli trial with
this probability. On success of the trial, the weight of connection between these
two nodes is increased by one. This entire process is repeated until the total
weight of all edges becomes the same as in the input network. The last step is
to run Louvain community detection on the resulting network and compare the
output with the original network communities.
5. Results
We test the network generator by generating 100 synthetic networks and
taking the average scores to avoid any statistically insignificant outliers. We use
the Louvain community detection algorithm to find the group structure of each
generated network. Then, using the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI)
method (Danon et al., 2005), we compare groups detected in the generated
networks to groups in the corresponding original network.
5.1. Results with Caviar and Ciel datasets
To evaluate how much the RANG generated synthetic networks are similar
to the original network used for input to RANG, we measure two aspects of
similarity. The first is group structure. For this purpose, we used Louvain com-
munity detection to find group structure of all compared networks. The second
aspect is management nodes. We find all management nodes by their high rela-
tive betweenness centrality in all compared networks. We use as threshold 90%
of the relative betweenness centrality metric of the node whose rank among the
highest values of this metric is equal to the number of management nodes in
the original network. For both datasets, we used weighted edge generators to
create three sets of synthetic networks. For the first set we used our Bernoulli
Weighted Random Network method, for the second set, the Weighted Random
Graph method, while for the last set, the weighted SBM described in Section
4.5.
Table 2 contains results of measurements of the first aspect of similarity that
synthetic networks generated by BWRN methods are by factor of two more
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Original Network Caviar Ciel
Generator RANG Weighted RANG Weighted
BWRN WRG SBM BWRN WRG SBM
mean 0.815 0.356 0.850 0.800 0.513 0.761
median 0.839 0.365 0.739 0.883 0.567 0.751
min 0.415 0.088 0.358 0.734 0.288 0.551
max 0.953 0.565 0.883 1.000 0.692 1.000
Table 2: Results show NMI scores from comparing the groups in networks generated from
the Caviar (columns 2-4) and Ciel (columns 5-7) original networks to groups in those original
networks. Three generators are compared. Columns 2, 5, show performance of RANG with our
Bernoulli Weighted Random Generator. In Columns 3, 6 results for RANG using Weighted
Random Graph method are displayed. Columns 4-7 contain results for the weighted SBM
baseline method. Our BWNR method outperformed the other two in terms of median values
for both Caviar and Ciel networks and mean value for Ciel network. The weighted SBM
method was close behind with the best score for mean value for Caviar. WRG method was
far behind with scores about half of the leading scores.
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similar to original group structures than groups in networks generated with
WRG method. The BWRN synthetic model and the weighted SBM baseline
performed close to each other.
Metric RANG & BWRN RANG & WRG Weighted SBM
Group NMI median 0.839 0.365 0.739
Jaccard Leadership 0.681 0.402 0.308
Combined Score 0.571 0.146 0.281
Table 3: Similarity of the original Caviar network to networks generated by our Random
Anonymized Network Generator first with our Bernoulli Weighted Random Network method,
then with Weighted Random Graph method. The third set of networks was generated by
Weighted SBM baseline. The first row of the results shows group structure similarity from
Table 2, the second the leadership similarity, and the last row shows the combined Score that
is the product of the first two scores. In all three rows, the best score is shown in bold font.
This means that the management structure is a differentiating factor in
comparing these two generators. It is evaluated in Table 3 that demonstrates
the importance of leadership detection for keeping the synthetic distinct but
close to the original network. The results obtained using Jaccard metric (Zaki
and Meira, 2020) show that the RANG generated networks using our Bernoulli
Weighted Random Network method preserve the group structure and leadership
hierarchy twice as well as the baseline generated networks and nearly four times
better than RANG using Weighted Random Graph method. Moreover, the
unweighted SBM generator performs much worse than the baseline with the
weighted SBM. n summary, our RANG approach better differentiates between
leadership and membership roles for nodes within groups while performing at
least slightly better than others on community detection. These results verify
the strength of RANG in preserving groups and hierarchy within the generated
networks.
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Figure 2: The presented Caviar networks depict a) the groups in the original network, and
groups detected in the synthetic networks with similarity that is (b) highest, (c) lowest, and
(d) average.
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5.2. Stability of group structures of covert networks
Generating statistically similar networks to a real network enables us to
analyze how stable is the structure of the original network. These networks
represent sets of small perturbations of the original network interconnections.
If many generated synthetic networks are structurally similar to the original
network, the latter network is stable and resistant to such perturbations. On
the other hand, if the structure of the original network is not stable, only a few
synthetic networks will be structurally similar to the real network.
We apply this analysis to the Caviar network, by generating G = 1000 ran-
dom synthetic networks, and comparing their structures to each other, and to
the structure of the Caviar original network. We start this analysis by creating
a meta-graph, nodes of which are the generated networks, so the size of the
meta-graph is G = 1000 nodes. For each node, we draw an undirected edge be-
tween this node and any other node in the meta-graph with a matching group
structure. We create two versions of the meta-graph. In one, edges represent an
exact matching. In another, the edges show flexible matching, which allows up
to one node difference in each group for drawing an edge. Figure 3 shows the
resulting distribution of the node degrees in meta-graph with exact matching.
We find that the original network’s structure repeats ten times for exact match-
ing among 1000 generated synthetic networks. Thus, this structure is not very
stable. It is sensitive to small perturbations in node connectivity in the gener-
ated networks. In contrast, we also find that the most frequent group structure
occurs 177 times with exact matching, and 310 times for flexible matching. It
also happens to be the most similar to the original detected group structure.
The synthetic network with this structure is shown in Sub-figure 2(b). More-
over, each of the top ten most frequently occurring structures repeats at least
20 times for exact matching, and at least 206 times for flexible matching. The
remaining generated networks have either unique structures, or structures that
were similar to only a few generated networks.
From a practical perspective, the identification of stable groups in a criminal
organization is important. It will help analysts to concentrate on group struc-
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Figure 3: The histogram of meta-graph degree distribution for exact matching of groups in
the generated networks. The x-axis defines the node degree d, while the y-axis shows n(d),
the number of nodes with d degree. The group structure of the original network is not stable
because only 1% of synthetic networks share this structure.
tures that arise frequently and thus represent plausible interpretations of data
collected about the network. Simulating interdiction on alternative structures
reveals a range of outcomes. Using the meta-graph of generated networks, ana-
lysts can compute probabilities of these outcomes providing the distribution of
the interdiction outcomes for the given original network.
6. Conclusions
We introduce and make available to researchers and analysts a network gen-
erator that produces synthetic networks statistically similar to the given real or
synthetic network. The first goal of this work is to enable sharing data between
analysts who own sensitive data about current investigations and researchers,
who need realistic networks to develop efficient tools for network analytics. Only
owners of the data can enable sharing of sensitive data. They can properly
separate abstract structural information about network from the sensitive per-
sonal and operational information. The former is first encapsulated by owners
into three lists of nodes, groups and management roles and then further trans-
formed into numeric, possible shuffled node ids, nodes’ clustering into groups
19
and statistics about edges and their weights across those clusters. Hence, the
description of this original networks passed to researchers is succinct and void
of personal data. The output of the generated networks follows the same format
as is required for input. The model uses the introduced here Bernoulli Weighted
Random Network generator that creates the edges whose average sum of weights
is the same as it is in the original network. It also uses the Stochastic Block
Model to create alternative group structures to those existing in the original
network. To preserve the organizational aspects of the original network, we use
a hierarchical network model.
In general, our generator is broadly applicable to social networks, both with
formal and informal organizational structures. It aims at aiding analyses and
investigations of covert networks with partial information about their nodes,
edges, and internal structures. The generator enables researchers to develop
algorithms and systems on the generated synthetic networks for use in real
applications.
Even the analyst have only partially knowledge of the covert networks during
investigation. Therefore, the important second use of the generator is as a tool
for analysts to use it for network analytics on the original network. Studying
the generated synthetic networks statistically similar to a given covert network
is useful in two ways. Differences between those networks suggest the potential
alternative interpretations of data or the need for collecting more data. The
similarities between those networks will enable the analysts to find stable parts
of the original network structure. The more synthetic networks we have, the
more we can analyze and understand the operations, leadership, and groups
present in the original network. More generally, the distribution of probabilities
for the alternative interpretations enables new network analytics. The analysts
can find community structures which are frequent, therefore stable under per-
turbations. They may also analyze how the stability changes with the strength
of perturbation. For covert networks, the analysts can quantify statistically ex-
pected outcomes of interdiction. This kind of analytics applies to all complex
network in which the data are incomplete or partially incorrect.
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We thoroughly tested the generator on two real covert networks, Caviar and
Ciel. To measure the similarity between the generated networks and the original
one, we use the well-known Louvain community detection algorithm. Applying
the NMI and the Jaccard metrics, we measured the results, which demonstrate
the high similarities among generated networks and the original one.
We conclude that accounting for groups and a management hierarchy of
a network is essential for generating synthetic networks that are statistically
similar to the original network.
In future work, we plan to add the fourth step of network generation going
beyond the original graph to enable its hierarchical network expansion. One way
to accomplish it is to replicate any part of the original network multiple times
at any level of hierarchy and provide additional levels of management hierarchy
if needed. Such an extension will allow the researchers and analysts to study
evolution of covert networks and potential interdiction outcomes in large and
complex criminal networks.
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